Research Interests: Formal Political Theory, Political Economy, Game Theory, Microeconomic Theory.

Reputation and Accountability in Repeated Elections   [Download PDF]

This version: July 2010

Abstract:

This paper studies a model of infinitely repeated elections in which voters attempt simultaneously to select competent politicians and to provide them with incentives to exert costly effort. Voters are unable to incentivize effort if they base their reelection decisions only on incumbent reputation. However, equilibria in which voters use reputation-dependent performance cutoffs (RDC) to make reelections decisions exist and support positive effort. In these equilibria, politicians’ effort is decreasing in reputation, and expected performance is decreasing in tenure. Like the equilibria in Ferejohn 1986, RDC equilibria rely on voters being indifferent between reelecting incumbents and electing challengers. I show that this voter-indifference condition is closely related to weak renegotiation-proofness (Farrell and Maskin 1989). Read Paper...

Super Tuesday: Campaign Finance and the Dynamics of Sequential Elections [Download PDF]

Abstract:

I present a model of campaign finance in primary elections in which campaigns supply hard information about candidates' electability. Focusing on a class of equilibria in which informed voters vote according to the signal they observe, I show that bandwagons can arise in equilibrium when a third party is financing campaigns.

To address the controversy surrounding the timing of presidential primaries in the United States, I examine the welfare effects of making changes to the electoral calendar. For relatively low campaign costs, a calendar with a block of voters voting simultaneously early in the process, followed by the remaining voters voting consecutively, is optimal for voters and the party. This result provides a rationale for “Super Tuesdays” in U.S. presidential primaries. For higher campaign costs, a sequential calendar is optimal. Donors always prefer a sequential electoral calendar. Read Paper...

Preference for Variety [Download PDF 185KB]

with Karen Kaiser

Abstract:

We consider a decision maker who enjoys choosing from a varied set of alternatives. Building on behavioral evidence, we axiomatize preference for variety and provide a representation theorem. We go on to illustrate the potential effects of preference for variety in a model of retailing. Consumer welfare may be decreasing in the competitiveness of the retailing sector as competition eliminates the scope for retailers to offer variety. Mainstream consumers with a preference for variety and consumers with eccentric tastes enjoy a symbiotic relationship. Competition over mainstream consumers makes retailers offer more exotic goods, while eccentric consumers subsidize their carrying costs. Read Paper...

Recruiting, Elections, and the Quality of Government [Download PDF]

Abstract:

I propose a model of representative democracy in which the value of holding office and candidate identity are endogenous.  The quality of government is jointly determined by equilibrium levels of candidate ability and allocation of resources toward the public good.  Comparative statics suggest that while increasing the power of a political post may attract higher ability candidates, it may also have a negative effect on the quality of government.  The model also provides insight into the motivation of weak challengers. Read Paper...